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FROM HEALTH POLICY TO STIGMA AND BACK AGAIN:  
THE FEEDBACK LOOP PERPETUATING THE OPIOIDS CRISIS 
 
Nicolas Terry* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Between 1999 and 2017, almost 400,000 people died from opioid overdoses,1 
and since 2001, the opioid crisis has cost the U.S. more than 1 trillion dollars.2 In 
late 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary opined 
that the country was “beginning to turn the tide” in responding to the crisis.3 
Secretary Azar’s positive statements were based on preliminary CDC data that 
showed a national decline of 2.7 percent in drug overdose deaths from October 2017 
to May 2018.4 However, data still show over half the states posting an increase in 
overdose deaths5 with a concentration of higher death rates in the upper Midwest 
and Appalachia.6 Recent sobering data from CDC, also showed a national decline in 
life expectancy for the third year in a row.7 A 2018 McKinsey report argued that the 
                                               
* © 2019 Nicolas Terry. I am grateful to the Indiana University Additions Grand 
Challenge for supporting this research. Responding to the Addictions Crisis, INDIANA 
UNIVERSITY, https://grandchallenges.iu.edu/addiction/index.html [https://perma.cc/4JVA-
TC76]. Hall Render Professor of Law, Executive Director, Hall Center for Law and Health, 
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Email: npterry@iupui.edu. I express 
my thanks to Aila Hoss for her thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and to Emily 
Beukema for her research and editorial assistance. 
1 Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/GB3Y-ZLF3]. 
2 Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALATRUM 
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://altarum.org/news/economic-toll-opioid-crisis-us-exceeded-1-
trillion-2001 [https://perma.cc/XL4G-D85T]. 
3 E.g., German Lopez, Trump’s Health Secretary Says the Opioid Epidemic May Be 
Turning Around. Not so Fast., VOX (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2018/10/24/18015532/opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2018-alex-azar-trump 
[https://perma.cc/VQG4-YZVT].  
4 Id. As of April 2019, the CDC predicts a decline of 3.2% between September 2017 
and September 2018, see Vital Statistics Rapid Release: Provisional Drug Overdose Death 
Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/ 
drug-overdose-data.htm [https://perma.cc/9W6L-QP42] [hereinafter Vital Statistics]. 
5 See Vital Statistics, supra note 4.  
6 HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 329, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2017, at 3 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/ 
db329-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4T9-54UK].  
7 SHERRY L. MURPHY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 328, MORTALITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2017, 6 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db328-h.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/798B-84SN]. 
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number of persons suffering from opioid use disorder (“OUD”) is likely to be an 
underestimate with the actual number being between four and six million persons.8 
Even if the most optimistic projections about opioid overdose deaths proved correct, 
we will still face new dangers in fentanyl cocktails, as it is mixed with other street 
or diverted drugs such as Methamphetamine, cocaine, or benzodiazepines.9 Neither 
is there any evidence that we are now better prepared for the next addiction crisis. 
Why is it that the United States seems to have little resilience in the face of such 
crises? Why aren’t those at risk being diagnosed earlier through preventative care? 
Why are so many of those suffering with OUD denied any care or are unable to find 
adequate treatment, coordinated care, or recovery services? An earlier article 
concentrated on flaws in the healthcare system, arguing that healthcare itself was a 
structural determinant of the continuing crisis.10 Specifically, that article was critical 
of access and benefit stratification, the failure of some states to adopt Medicaid 
expansion (or having done so to make enrollment dependent on burdensome 
administrative or work requirements), persistent problems associated with 
fragmentation of care, sub-optimal care coordination, and the lack of wraparound 
services.11 
This Article seeks to provide additional context for those structural 
determinants. Furthermore, this analysis extends to identifying causes that are 
upstream (for example, social determinants) or downstream (for example, 
exceptionalism) from those identified healthcare structural determinants. These 
causes and effects include the limitations of our federal structure, social and 
structural determinants, and the implications of stigma-reinforcing policymaking. 
Together they conspire to create a feedback loop fueled by inadequate goals, 
strategies, and tactics. 
                                               
8 Sarun Charumilind et al., Why We Need Bolder Action to Combat the Opioid 
Epidemic, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Sept. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ 
healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder-action-to-combat-the-
opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/PQ5Q-92TU].  
9 See HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,  CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DRUGS MOST FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN DRUG 
OVERDOSE DEATHS: UNITED STATES, 2011–2016 1 (2018); Rachel L. Rothberg & Katie T. 
Smith, Fentanyl: A Whole New World?, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 314 (2018) (discussing the 
growing black market for fentanyl and the danger it presents because of its potency); see also 
Lauren B. Gerlach et al., Factors Associated with Long-term Benzodiazepine Use Among 
Older Adults, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED.  1560, 1560 (2018) (noting that one in three older 
adults prescribed a benzodiazepine by a nonpsychiatric clinician progressed to risky long-
term use). 
10 Nicolas Terry, Structural Determinism Amplifying the Opioid Crisis: It’s the 
Healthcare, Stupid, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 315 (2019). 
11 Id. 
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Implicit in this Article is the belief that the U.S. response to the opioid overdose 
epidemic is and likely will continue to be fatally flawed. The explicit claim is that 
there are multiple causes for this failure and they, each in turn, have negative effects 
further downstream. Thus, the absence of a national health policy is both caused by 
and plays out in the impact of federalism on healthcare. Healthcare federalism is 
partly responsible for failing to adequately address social and structural 
determinants, while social determinants, such as unemployment or poverty, feed into 
healthcare structural determinants, such as limited access to care. Those structural 
barriers in turn tend to be approached with incremental reforms or exceptional 
“solutions” (themselves relatable to the absence of a holistic national health policy). 
Furthermore, the health discrimination inherent in exceptional rather than parity 
models feeds competing narratives (such as moral defect) about the causes of 
addictions. Competing narratives give rise to uneven, incomplete, or just plain bad 
policies; a rise in policies that perpetuate stigma, delay harm reduction strategies, 
and promote supply-side criminalization. Completing the feedback loop, stigma 
works against innovative, inclusive national (or even state) policies. The Article 
concludes with a brief analysis of the SUPPORT Act of 2018 and explains why this, 
the latest well-intentioned federal “solution” to the opioid crisis, hones true to the 
systemic issues outlined herein. 
  
Deficient 
National Health 
Policy
Consequences 
of Federalism
Social 
Determinants
Structural 
Determinants
Exceptionalism 
and Stigma
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II.  DEFICIENT NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 
 
Many, if not most, of the recent national,12 regional,13 and state14 reports on the 
opioid crisis have endorsed healthcare and public health initiatives, such as broader 
availability of all three types of FDA-approved medication assisted treatment 
(“MAT”) in multiple treatment settings (including in prisons and jails), the provision 
of wrap-around services, and efforts to tackle the social determinants of health. 
Remarkably, there even seems to be broad bipartisan support for these ideas as 
evidenced by the passage of a series of federal funding statutes between 2016 and 
2018.15 Yet, even with expanded financing from the federal government, progress 
has been slow. In part, this has been due to flaws in short-term financing models 
such as grants. However, the major problem has been in implementation. 
Implementation is impeded because the U.S. lacks a coherent national health 
policy. Without some overarching concept and architecture for providing care, a 
healthcare “system” is likely to be fragmented and ill-equipped to deal with novel 
stressors, such as syndemics or natural disasters. As recognized by the World Health 
Organization, national health policies include a defined vision and policy directions 
together with strategies for implementation.16 A national health policy could also 
influence other areas of government planning, by pursuing the “Health in All 
                                               
12 See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: 
THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 4-1, 4-10–11 (2016), 
https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RPC3-Y3KV]; see also OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS FINAL 
REPORT (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Repo 
rt_Draft_11-15-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/73V2-34FG] (demonstrating a national effort to 
combat drug addiction); Governors’ Recommendations for Federal Action to End the 
Nation’s Opioid Crisis, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://classic.nga.org/cms/governors-recommendations-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/A2 
MB-QCQJ] (demonstrating another national effort to combat drug addiction). 
13 See e.g., APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, COMMUNICATING ABOUT OPIOIDS IN 
APPALACHIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND BEST PRACTICES (2018), http://operation 
unite.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Opioid-communication-in-appalachia-ORAU-report 
-1-17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HV4-K3J6].  
14 See e.g., IND. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE , INDIANA DRUG PREVENTION, TREATMENT AND 
ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY ACTION STEPS (May 18, 2017), http://www.in.gov/gov/files/ 
DPTE%20Preliminary%20Action%20Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/B34R-KZ6Y]; see also 
IND. PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION TASK FORCE, TAKING ACTION: THE FOUR 
YEAR REPORT 2012–2016, at 6–10 (2016), https://www.in.gov/bitterpill/files/FINAL%20 
Four%20Years%20In%20Action%20Report%20-%20OAG%20Coverchange%20final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5D2K-LYYZ].  
15 See infra note 142. 
16 National Health Policies, Strategies, and Plans, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 3, 
2019), https://www.who.int/nationalpolicies/nationalpolicies/en/ [https://perma.cc/A5JG-
M78Z]. 
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Polices” (“HiAP”) approach to policymaking in order to correct the socioeconomic 
inequalities responsible for some of the social determinants of health.17 
Obviously, the U.S. has some centralized healthcare regulation and 
management. For example, the FDA18 and HHS-OCR19 regulate drugs and devices 
and health privacy, respectively. More pertinently, Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) administers Medicare that covers more than seventeen 
percent of the population, has its own policies, and often acts as a bellwether for 
private payers.20 CMS also has been active in pulling policy levers to combat the 
opioid epidemic, promoting prevention, treatment, and data collection.21 However, 
there are at least four reasons why centralized regulation of healthcare, even when 
accompanied by financing, is not the same as a national health policy. First, a true 
national health policy runs wider and deeper than these federal models. According 
to Carl Ameringer, “[t]he failure of the U.S. government to construct a national 
health policy that reconciles diverse priorities means that there are no overriding 
principles to guide health care delivery.”22 Second, Congress, the branch of 
government best positioned to develop health policy, is locked in divisive 
partisanship, which is generally and bitterly divided on healthcare reform.23 Third, 
most healthcare in the U.S. is provided by private entities or persons.24 The resulting 
fragmented system is paid for by a fragmented financing model; the federal and state 
governments pay the largest share (41%), followed by private health insurance 
(34%) and individuals’ out-of-pocket expenses (11%).25 Fourth, Ameringer’s 
                                               
17 See generally Health in All Policies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(June 9, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/policy/hiap/index.html [https://perma.cc/DE9Z-LQB7] 
(discussing “a collaborative approach that integrates and articulates health considerations 
into policymaking across sectors to improve the health of all communities . . . .”). 
18 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (1946). 
19 45 C.F.R. § 164.500–164.534 (2001). 
20 Medicare Beneficiaries as a Percent of Total Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/medicare-beneficiaries-as-of-total-
pop/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22
:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/NU26-4MTP]. 
21 See e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS ROADMAP: FIGHTING THE 
OPIOD CRISIS (2019), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/Emergency/ 
Downloads/Opioid-epidemic-roadmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CYJ-9ULV].  
22 CARL AMERINGER, U.S. HEALTH POLICY AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: DOCTORS, 
REFORMERS, AND ENTREPRENEURS 13 (2018). 
23 Alison Kodjak, Democrats’ Health Care Ambitions Meet the Reality of Divided 
Government, NPR (Jan. 9, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/01/09/683055963/democrats-health-care-ambitions-meet-the-reality-of-divided-
government [https://perma.cc/8X22-4ZQZ]. 
24 Josh Cothran, Infographic — US Health Care Spending: Who Pays?, CAL. HEALTH 
CARE FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.chcf.org/publication/us-health-care-spending-
who-pays/ [https://perma.cc/AX79-BTMX]. 
25 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS 101: A CONTINUING ECONOMIC 
THREAT 22 (2018), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/HealthCareCosts 
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS2P-SFNE]. 
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observations have particular salience in the opioid context: “neither the provision of 
care nor the financing of it targets the entire population” and that “finance and 
delivery are mostly separate and distinct.”26 It is likely that these issues are further 
exacerbated by the lack of HiAP coordination between U.S. healthcare and other 
federal or state social services.  
Only an approximation of a national healthcare policy can be inferred from the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”):27 that the federal government will encourage, even 
subsidize access to health insurance.28 However, a true national healthcare policy 
requires more broadly stated goals, such as universal access to care or the adoption 
of the principle of solidarity.29 In contrast, a Rand analysis of post-ACA healthcare 
policy instead identified a paralyzed policy environment revealing:  
 
tensions between many health policy goals—for example, expanding 
coverage versus reducing costs; targeting tax credits effectively versus 
incentivizing work; protecting the sickest and most expensive patients 
versus preserving choice among the majority of patients who may not need 
comprehensive coverage; and limiting the federal government’s cost 
liability versus minimizing cost-shifting to consumers and states.30 
 
A national healthcare policy also should be the place for broad-ranging, 
evidence-based cost-effectiveness analysis. For example, the Surgeon General’s 
2016 report concluded that “evaluations of Medicaid expenditures for substance use 
disorder treatment show that the costs of treating substance use disorders are more 
than offset by the accompanying savings to Medicaid in reduced health care costs, 
such as reductions in future substance use disorder-related hospitalizations and 
residential treatment costs.”31 For example, a 2008 report from Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (“SAMHSA”) estimated that every dollar 
spent on effective school-based programs would save an estimated $18 in education 
and healthcare costs.32 The National Insititute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”) estimates 
that “every dollar invested in addiction treatment programs yields a return of 
between $4 and $7 in reduced drug-related crime, criminal justice costs, and theft. 
                                               
26 AMERINGER, supra note 22, at 13.  
27 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
28 See, e.g., Subsidized Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
glossary/subsidized-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/XY95-X6MN]. 
29 See generally Richard B. Saltman, Health Sector Solidarity: A Core European Value 
But with Broadly Varying Content, 4 ISR. J. HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1 (2015). 
30 The Future of U.S. Health Care: Replace or Revise the Affordable Care Act?, RAND 
HEALTH CARE, https://www.rand.org/health-care/key-topics/health-policy/in-depth.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GW8-DZRJ].  
31 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6–18 . 
32 TED R. MILLER & DELIA HENDRIE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 
ADMIN., SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION DOLLARS AND CENTS: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
2 (2008), https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/cost-benefits-prevention.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VVM-5ZBT]. 
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When savings related to healthcare are included, total savings can exceed costs by a 
ratio of 12 to 1.”33 A HiAP approach could also be implemented through reallocation 
of resources; for example, Ohio’s “Issue 1” drug decriminalization constitutional 
amendment that failed in 2018 would have required the state to invest sums saved 
from the reduction of inmates on drug treatment, crime victim, and rehabilitation 
programs.34 Finally, national policies can result in broader strategic initiatives. For 
example, the opioid crisis requires healthcare and public health initiatives that 
extend beyond harm reduction and include broader availability of all three types of 
FDA-approved MAT in multiple treatment settings (including in prisons and jails),35 
the provision of wrap-around services, and efforts to tackle the social determinants 
of health. 
 
III.  FEDERALISM 
 
National healthcare policies tend to be associated with unitary governments.36 
To an extent, therefore, federalism is intertwined with our national healthcare policy 
vacuum. Furthermore, federalism reinforces the fragmentation of our healthcare 
system. Even after the ACA (that was viewed by some conservatives as a 
“usurpation” of long-standing state authority in regulating private insurance37), the 
levers of central government are quite limited, with states still responsible for 
exercising their police powers to protect the welfare, safety, and health of the public. 
The economies of the U.S. states have recovered from the great recession.38 
However, Medicaid now absorbs more than seventeen percent of state revenue39 and 
                                               
33 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A 
RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 14 (3rd ed. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/675/ 
principles-of-drug-addiction-treatment-a-research-based-guide-third-edition [https://perma. 
cc/DQ4G-DXVV].  
34 Ohio Issue 1, Drug and Criminal Justice Policies Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Issue_1,_Drug_and_Criminal_Justice_Policies_Initiative_(20
18) [https://perma.cc/M8RP-89FT]. 
35 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6–18. 
36 WORLD HEALTH ORG., ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICES IN EUROPE: COUNTRY REPORTS 5, 23, 35, 49, 95 (Bernd Rechel et al. eds., 2018), 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/370946/public-health-services.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74GU-BQAT]. 
37 EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER & BRIAN C. BLASE, THE HERITAGE FOUND., OBAMACARE: 
IMPACT ON STATES 1 (2010), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2433.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9UXA-UAHP].  
38 See generally Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, PEW (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2014/05/19/fiscal-50-state-
trends-and-analysis [https://perma.cc/8DY2-S9PW].  
39 Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis: More Than 17 Percent of State Revenue Goes 
to Medicaid, PEW (June 20, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind7 [https://perma.cc/3X54-3MUY].  
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states hit hardest by the opioid epidemic are experiencing slower growth.40 The 
states alone cannot fund the kind of healthcare initiatives necessitated by the opioid 
epidemic. Therefore, the states must look to the federal government. This implicates 
a legion of problems. First, until quite recently there has not been very much 
Congressional enthusiasm for paying for the opioid epidemic.41 Second, when it 
comes to the financing of healthcare (particularly Medicaid), Congressional 
conservatives want to see a reduction in the uncapped flow of money to the states, 
preferring block grants that provide limited sums for defined purposes.42 The other 
way that the federal government caps the flow of funds to the states in emergencies 
is by establishing federally supervised grant programs. During the opioid epidemic, 
this has translated into grant programs administered by SAMHSA.43 Typically, 
however generous, grants are time-limited without any guarantee of renewal. Such 
short spending horizons can handcuff state governments who will be hesitant to 
build out infrastructure and capacity without having ongoing funding to service it. 
Third, assuming the federal appropriations process is successfully navigated,44 there 
will be delays in the distribution of funds as federal and state regulators work to draft 
funding mechanisms and oversight regulations in advance of releasing resources to 
bear on the crisis.  
Sometimes the downsides of federalism are spun as an opportunity, “that a 
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”45 
However, in healthcare and particularly in responses to the opioid epidemic, the 
mythology surrounding state or private entity laboratories of innovation seems 
                                               
40 Barb Rosewicz & Joe Fleming, Look West for Strongest Growth Since the Recession, 
PEW (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/11 
/19/look-west-for-strongest-growth-since-the-recession [https://perma.cc/7RSJ-L2XX].  
41 See Associated Press, U.S. Government Will Spend $4.6 Billion Fighting Opioid 
Crisis. Advocates Say That’s Not Nearly Enough, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2018, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-opiod-crisis-20180325-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/W3FA-CP75] (providing a quote from a former U.S. representative stating that 
“Congress needs to devote more money”).  
42 Peter Sullivan, Trump Officials Consider Allowing Medicaid Block Grants for States, 
HILL (Jan. 11, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/424988-trump-
officials-consider-allowing-medicaid-block-grants-for-states [https://perma.cc/H4PT-
AVN7]; see generally Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: How Does It 
Work and What Are the Implications?, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-how-does-it-work-and-what-
are-the-implications/ [https://perma.cc/7HKQ-K4BF]. 
43 See, e.g., State Opioid Response Grants, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVS. ADMIN. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/ti-18-
015 [https://perma.cc/847Y-88MF].  
44 See generally JAMES V. SATURNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/8013e37d-4a09-46f0-b1e2-c14915d498a6.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WJ5P-VNH3].  
45 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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defensible.46 As Kristin Madison notes, “[f]lexibility permits but does not guarantee 
innovation.”47 Indeed, the federal tools intended to promote state innovation such as 
Section 111548 and Section 1332 waivers49 increasingly are being used to undermine 
not improve federal health policies.50 Furthermore, many apparent state innovations 
such as Washington’s plans for a “public option,”51 Minnesota’s reinsurance 
program,52 or Maryland’s proposed individual mandate53 are less about 
experimentation and more about building state moats to protect against federal 
neglect, sabotage, or piece-by-piece repeal of the ACA.54 
Pockets of innovation in opioid policy or innovation are detectible and should 
be lauded. They include the MAT programs at Rikers Island55 and in Rhode Island,56 
                                               
46 Cf. Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2018) (arguing that state “laboratories” are rare and that the federal 
government is a key driver of experimentaion). 
47 Kristin Madison, Building A Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting 
Health System Experimentation, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 765, 776 (2014). 
48 Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstrative Waivers: The Current 
Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 12, 
2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-
waivers-the-current-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/G8PT-
HTW9].  
49 Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-
innovation-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/V9DQ-UE74]. 
50 See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Using the 1332 State Waiver Program to Undermine the 
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TRIB. (June 15, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-health-insurers-propose-
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individual-mandate-20180216-story.html [https://perma.cc/6UQV-M39V].  
54 See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, City of Columbus 
v. Trump, No. 18-cv-2364 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2018), https://democracyforward.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/ACA-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FRT-LFYX] (alleging 
sabotage of ACA by the Trump Administration). 
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the Police Assisted Addiction Recovery Initiative (PAARI) program in Gloucester, 
Massachusetts,57 and Vermont’s Hub-and-Spoke treatment model.58 Overall, 
however, innovations in the opioid space such as safe injection sites are as likely to 
be faced with objections based on stigma and moral defect.59 Equally, state programs 
may find themselves battling their own “federalism” problem as decentralization 
within the states delegates’ questions, such as whether to implement a syringe 
exchange to smaller political entities like county departments of health.60 
 
IV.  SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 
 
Nowhere are the absence of a national healthcare policy and federalism felt 
more than in the public healthcare system. According to the Institute of Medicine,  
 
The fragmentation of the governmental public health infrastructure is in 
part a direct result of the way in which governmental roles and 
responsibilities at the federal, state, and local levels have evolved over 
U.S. history. This history also explains why the nation lacks a 
comprehensive national health policy that could be used to align health-
sector investment, governmental public health agency structure and 
function, and incentives for the private sector to work more effectively as 
part of a broader public health system.61 
 
Without a properly funded and organized public healthcare system, the U.S. will 
continue struggling to address the social determinants of health. Social determinants 
are nonmedical factors, such as “the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, 
work and age . . . [and] are mostly responsible for health inequities.”62 They include 
education, housing, employment (there are relatively few recovery-friendly 
workplaces63), and the availability of transport. Social determinants have been 
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57 See Davida M. Schiff et al., A Police-Led Addiction Treatment Referral Program in 
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TREATMENT 41, 42 (2017).  
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59 Jessica Cohen, Supervised Injection Facilities Face Obstacles, But That Shouldn’t 
Stop Them, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
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60 See e.g., IND. CODE  § 16-41-7.5-5 (West 2019). 
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(2003), https://www.nap.edu/read/10548/chapter/5 [https://perma.cc/J6LB-UVBX]. 
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extensively identified with the opioid epidemic. For example, OUD frequently is 
identified as a “disease of despair,”64 similar to those detailed by Anne Case and 
Angus Deaton and which are characterized by an increase in mortality and morbidity 
among non-Hispanic white Americans without college degrees caused in part by “an 
increasingly difficult labor market.”65 Increasing economic inequality and other 
issues such as social isolation add to the picture and stoke addictions crises. In Dayna 
Matthew’s words, “social determinants contribute to hopelessness and social trauma 
that ‘set the stage’ for opioid abuse and dependency.”66 We also know the opposite 
can be true, as improvements in healthcare lead to increased civic engagement such 
as voting.67  
In the absence of national health and public healthcare policies, we will 
continue to see large geographical pockets suffer the worst of the opioid epidemic 
as it falls disproportionately on “Tobacco Nation,”68 upper Midwestern, 
Appalachian, and Southern states that exhibit poverty, inadequate health care, 
underfinanced public health, and marginalized populations.69 Comorbid substance 
use problems and other chronic diseases are far more likely to be found in the poor.70 
However, these high risk states tend to perpetuate structural determinants as many 
of them have either failed to expand Medicaid or have imperiled enrollment (and 
hence access) by introducing administrative or work requirements.71 This lack of 
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THE UPSHOT (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/upshot/medicaid-
expansion-voting-increase.html [https://perma.cc/B2D4-79J8]. 
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IN THE U.S. 1–2 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://truthinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Tobacco-Nation-
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the Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
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(2018) (noting that comorbid conditions are more prevelant among low-income people). 
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health equity, together with what sometimes appears to be a declaration of war on the 
poor,72 make it hard to improve resilience to addictions crises such as by re-building 
the social capital that seems to protect communities from the opioid epidemic.73  
 
V.  STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS 
 
The absence of a principled national healthcare policy, the uneasy alliance 
between the federal government and the states on the financing of health insurance, 
and the fragmented delivery of healthcare through heterogeneous private entities 
create a breeding ground for structural determinants that adversely affect healthcare 
generally and opioid treatment specifically. An earlier article argued in detail that 
facets of the healthcare system are themselves structural determinants that obstruct 
the remediation of social determinants of health or perpetuate them.74 Viewing the 
healthcare system as a structural determinant explains at least some of its failures to 
provide preventative care, treatment, and recovery service to those suffering from 
OUD.75 Many of the barriers erected can be grouped as either access to healthcare 
or healthcare delivery. 
In the U.S., access to healthcare equates with access to public or private health 
insurance. There is strong correlation between low rates of un-insurance and high 
levels of MAT.76 In 2016, the Surgeon General’s report was clear, “a fundamental 
way to address disparities is to increase the number of people who have health 
coverage [and] The Affordable Care Act provides several mechanisms that broaden 
access to coverage.”77 There are two principal mechanisms: lower cost individual 
insurance available for purchase from the marketplace exchanges78 and Medicaid 
expanded to a larger population.79 However, ACA exchange sabotage by the Trump 
Administration, work requirements, and other barriers to Medicaid are increasing 
the number of uninsured persons after the steady decline seen since the passage of 
the ACA.80 
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The ACA sought to make the marketplace policies premiums affordable by 
providing tax credits81 and requiring insurance-companies to subsidize cost-
sharing.82 In very general terms, persons are eligible for financial assistance if their 
income is between 138% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”).83 The 
exchange marketplaces showed some volatility under the administration of President 
Obama but latterly premiums showed signs of stabilizing and growing their 
enrollments.84 However, after the 2016 election of President Trump, the markets 
again became volatile amidst threats of “repeal and replace,”85 the zero-outing of the 
individual mandate,86 and various administration moves to sabotage the marketplace 
processes and their risk pools.87 Premiums have continued to increase modestly;88 
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however, enrollments are down.89 Another related phenomenon is picking up steam 
in the private insurance market, this time in employer-funded group insurance: 
increasingly, the insured are finding themselves underinsured because of increases 
in out-of-pocket costs.90 
Medicaid expansion, which became optional for the states after the Supreme 
Court ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius,91 increased the upper level of eligibility for 
Medicaid. Like those with marketplace policies, the newly eligible Medicaid 
population are guaranteed certain essential health benefits including mental health 
and substance use services.92 Beyond improving access to care, Medicaid also opens 
paths to reimbursement for upstream services aimed at improving social 
determinants of health.93 The obvious direct result of not expanding Medicaid is 
maintaining a cohort of uninsured persons that likely correlates with a disease of 
despair population. However, there are also indirect effects. For example, Medicaid 
expansion correlates with reductions in uncompensated care94 and generally positive 
financial performance of hospitals, and it reduces the likelihood of closure of rural 
hospitals.95 Most importantly, expansion correlates with reduced rates of poverty.96 
Medicaid expansion also seems to lift all boats; according to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), “low-income adults in states that expanded Medicaid 
generally reported better access to health care. For example, they were less likely to 
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[https://perma.cc/WE37-M4KG]. 
91 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2018). 
93 Enrique Martinez-Vidal et al., Overcoming Challenges to Medicaid Investments in 
Social Determinants of Health, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG  (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180612.152825/full/ [https://perma.cc/U 
8D3-VHCV]; see also Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role 
of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (May 10, 2018), https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/beyond-health-
care-the-role-of-social-determinants-in-promoting-health-and-health-equity/ [https://perma. 
cc/6HN7-7C9X]. 
94 David Dranove et al., The Impact of the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion on Hospitals’ 
Uncompensated Care Burden and the Potential Effects of Repeal, COMMONWEALTH FUND 
(May 3, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/may/ 
impact-acas-medicaid-expansion-hospitals-uncompensated-care [https://perma.cc/8D9G-
BSJZ]. 
95 Richard C. Lindrooth et al., Understanding the Relationship Between Medicaid 
Expansions and Hospital Closures, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 111, 116–18 (2018).  
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report having unmet medical needs (such as not being able to afford their 
prescriptions)—whether or not they were insured.”97 Overall, the Medicaid 
population maps closely to the population of nonelderly adults with opioid addiction 
and even more so to those with low incomes.98 For example, after Kentucky 
expanded Medicaid, it experienced a 700 percent increase in the utilization of 
substance use services.99 Unfortunately, 14 states have still not expanded 
Medicaid,100 including southern states with poorly performing healthcare systems.101 
The Obama administration was successful in persuading some states with 
conservative governments to expand Medicaid by approving § 1115 waivers that 
required enrollees to have some “skin in the game” that require compliance with 
administrative requirements, paying premiums, contributing to health savings 
accounts, or requiring healthy behaviors.102 The Trump Administration has gone 
further, approving provisions such as work requirements that the prior 
administration rejected.103 Studies of these additional eligibility requirements show 
a dramatic, negative effect on enrollment.104 Particularly troubling are projections 
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104 MaryBeth Musumeci et al., An Early Look at Implementation of Medicaid Work 
Requirements in Arkansas, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/an-early-look-at-implementation-of-medicaid-
work-requirements-in-arkansas/ [https://perma.cc/6DAM-JXKL].  
800 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
about the impact of work requirements; for example, based on experiences in other 
states and other data, it has been estimated that Kentucky’s work requirement would 
lead to over 100,000 persons losing their eligibility.105 Assuming that persons with 
substance use disorder may have difficulty in fulfilling administrative requirements 
and may churn in and out of employment, it may be that those with OUD will be 
denied help from the program best matched to their circumstances. 
Structural determinants impeding access are only half the story. Our healthcare 
delivery systems also exhibit negative structural determinants. Many of these issues 
are standard fare, describing a healthcare system that lacks an overarching policy, is 
hopelessly fragmented leading to inadequate care coordination and case 
management, and has insufficient wraparound services.106 There is evidence that 
patients with multiple chronic conditions whose care is not coordinated are at far 
higher risk of emergency department visits.107 As with other chronic conditions or 
other vulnerable populations, those in need of treatment for OUD are particularly in 
need of such services.108 In particular, OUD patients are in critical need of care 
coordination.109 More broadly, the current OUD treatment delivery system simply is 
incomplete. Reflecting the through line from the absence of a national health policy 
through federalism to structural determinants, just because a state program is funded, 
the services it requires may not be available. State healthcare systems have been 
overwhelmed by demand for opioid services caused by a death of treatment centers 
and a qualified workforce.110 Even if a person suffering from OUD can find an 
outpatient treatment center, there is only a small chance that it will be suitable.111 
Non-medical detoxification and recovery models, such as 12-step programs, are 
used and often over-used in patients suffering from severe OUD, for whom the 
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standard of care is MAT.112 Indeed, many facilities remain detox-only or do not offer 
a full range of evidence-based MAT.113 For example, only a small number offer all 
three types of MAT (6.1%) and, even if they do, not all actually will receive MAT.114 
These types of services cannot just be switched “on.” They are dependent on 
investment, infrastructure, and workforce training. Some of the structural barriers 
are path dependent reminders of the unsatisfactory, stigma-laden history of treating 
those with behavioral health issues; segregating those suffering from substance from 
mainstream healthcare delivery and leaving their “treatment” to psychiatric hospitals 
or prisons.115 Examples include the Institutions for Mental Diseases (“IMD”) 
exclusion that prohibited Medicaid financing for care in mental health and substance 
use disorder residential treatment facilities larger than 16 beds, until it was 
suspended by the SUPPORT Act.116 Limitations persist regarding Opioid Treatment 
Programs (“OTP”), the required location for most MAT treatments.117 By law, OTPs 
must be accredited by an approved accrediting body and certified by SAMHSA.118 
Methadone can only be dispensed through an OTP certified by SAMHSA, and a few 
states have no such facilities. Methadone-based treatment is absent from a third of 
Medicaid state plans, and Medicare Part D (covering prescription drugs) does not 
include methadone or buprenorphine when used for treatment of opioid dependence 
in an opioid treatment program. Notwithstanding, innovation is possible. For 
example, Vermont’s “Hub-and-Spoke” delivery model splits the state into four 
                                               
112 Nora D. Volkow et al., Medication-Assisted Therapies — Tackling the Opioid-
Overdose Epidemic, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2064–65 (2014); see also Drugs, Brains, 
and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://d14rmgtrwz 
f5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/soa.pdf [https://perma.cc/E448-PPRY] (“Research 
shows that when treating addictions to opioids (prescription pain relievers or drugs like 
heroin or fentanyl), medication should be the first line of treatment, usually combined with 
some form of behavioral therapy or counseling.”). 
113 Hannah K. Knudsen et al., Barriers to the Implementation of Medication-Assisted 
Treatment for Substance Use Disorders: The Importance of Funding Policies and Medical 
Infrastructure, 34 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLAN. 375, 375–76, 379 (2011), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2011.02.004 [https://perma.cc/J3EU-MLGL]; see 
also Brendan Saloner & Colleen L. Barry, Ending the Opioid Epidemic Requires a Historic 
Investment in Medication-Assisted Treatment, 37 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 431, 432 
(2018).  
114 Mojtabai, supra note 111, at 18–20. 
115 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 1-19, 6-5. 
116 See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
117 Medication and Counseling Treatment, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment 
[https://perma.cc/XY6F-6DHJ]; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR OPIOID 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS 4 (2015), https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/pep15-
fedguideotp.pdf [https://perma.cc/847Y-88MF]. 
118 Opioid Treatment Program Certification, 42 C.F.R. § 8.11 (2018).  
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regions, each with a licensed outpatient treatment “hub” providing MAT.119 These 
hubs are linked to primary care “spokes” that provide counselling and 
buprenorphine. Depending on their needs, patients can be transferred between hub 
and spokes.120 Overall, however, in a fragmented system without centralized 
(including state or regional) planning it remains difficult to identify the levers or 
incentives that would cause providers to invest in care coordination and wrap-around 
services. 
The opioid crisis is a wicked problem;121 so is our healthcare system. Faced 
with complex, multi-faceted, interlocking problems, it is perhaps not surprising 
when policymakers favor tackling simpler problems and racking up an easy win. 
Indeed, the opioid crisis exemplifies efforts to solve macro problems with micro 
solutions. For example, the crisis exposed the serious asymmetry of drug supply and 
treatment. As with previous addictions crises, the instinctive reaction was to deal 
with the problem on the supply-side with micro solutions, such as limitations on 
prescribing,122 reimbursement restrictions,123 and the expansion of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs.124 The preferable solution would have involved confronting 
the other side of the asymmetry, to improve harm reduction and SUD treatment. 
Worse, because that was a micro-solution the prescription drug policies merely 
kicked the can down the road as far as tackling street opioids and the probable future 
undertreatment of pain. 
As a recent Commonwealth Fund reported, for many, their high expectations 
for U.S. healthcare are not delivered on as “it places unexpected and unnecessary 
burdens on the sick. People struggle to obtain effective treatments and services. 
                                               
119 John R. Brooklyn & Stacey C. Sigmon, Vermont Hub-and-Spoke Model of Care For 
Opioid Use Disorder: Development, Implementation, and Impact, 11 J. ADDICTICTION MED. 
286, 286–92 (2017). 
120 RICHARD A. RAWSON, VT. CTR. ON BEHAVIOR & HEALTH, VERMONT HUB-AND-
SPOKE MODEL OF CARE FOR OPIOID USE DISORDERS: AN EVALUATION 21–30 (2017), 
http://www.healthvermont.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/ADAP_Hub_and_Spoke_
Evaluation_2017_1.pdf. [https://perma.cc/KX93-ZF3G]. 
121 See generally Jonathan C. Lee, The Opioid Crisis Is a Wicked Problem, 27 AM. J. 
ON ADDICTIONS 51 (2017), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajad.12662 
[https://perma.cc/9M67-WXTH] (explaining how the opioid crisis meets the criteria of being 
considered a “wicked problem”). 
122 Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain — 
United States, 2016, 65 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 10–11 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/pdfs/ 
rr6501e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG67-NK6Z] 
123 2019 Medicare Advantage and Part D Advance Notice Part II and Draft Call Letter, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2019-medicare-advantage-and-part-d-advance-
notice-part-ii-and-draft-call-letter [https://perma.cc/N4PG-AW49]. 
124 Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Mandatory Use of Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs, 313 JAMA 891, 891–92 (2015). 
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Pervasive fragmentation and lack of coordination across the health system make 
obtaining services heavy labor for people with advanced illnesses or frailty.”125 
 
VI.  EXCEPTIONALISM AND STIGMA 
 
Deficiencies in policy and planning, lack of system resilience, and barriers 
created by structural determinants (when they are not simply denying access or 
impeding quality care) tend to result in incremental or piecemeal “solutions” to 
crises such as the opioid epidemic. Such an ecosystem (and, further, one not defined 
by broad national or social principles) can create differential treatment for persons 
(the access segmentation already discussed) or for diseases (for example, treating 
OUD differently from other chronic diseases such as diabetes). Some of the 
problems are caused by exceptional treatment of behavioral health while some of 
the solutions create exceptions to general rules. Upstream exceptionalism is likely 
explained by stigma. Downstream exceptionalism can cause it. And, as with deeply 
entrenched social determinants of health, ultimately it will be next to impossible to 
deal with addictions crises without eradicating stigma.  
Historically, behavioral and non-behavioral healthcare developed separately. 
Different rules regarding treatment, location of services, and data sharing bear 
testimony to the policies born out of stigma that treat mental illness or substance use 
differently from other chronic diseases. According to the Surgeon General’s report, 
“because substance misuse has traditionally been seen as a social or criminal 
problem, prevention services were not typically considered a responsibility of health 
care systems and people needing care for substance use disorders have had access to 
only a limited range of treatment options that were generally not covered by 
insurance.”126  
The ramifications have been serious. Although institutionalized care in 
psychiatric hospitals eventually gave way to community care, the latter was provided 
by nonintegrated treatment centers “geographically, financially, culturally, and 
organizationally separate from mainstream health care.”127 The result was 
stigmatizing separateness. SUD and mainstream healthcare even have distinct 
federal confidentiality regimes; SUD is subject to the Confidentiality of Substance 
Use Disorder Patient Records rule128 in addition to the HIPAA Privacy Rule which 
                                               
125 Eric C. Schneider et al., Health Care in America: The Experience of People with 
Serious Illness, COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://features.commonwealthfund.org/health-
care-in-america [https://perma.cc/7HV4-K3J6]. 
126 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6-1.  
127 Id. at 6-5. 
128 42 C.F.R. pt. 2 (2018); see generally LAURA ASHPOLE ET AL., 42 C.F.R. PART 2 IN 
RETROSPECTIVE: THE 30-YEAR JOURNEY OF THE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT 
CONFIDENTIALITY REGULATIONS (2017), https://www.healthlawyers.org/Members/Practice 
Groups/TaskForces/BH/briefings/Documents/42_CFR_Part2_MB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y 
U8S-8QCE ] (describing the history and reasoning that led to Part 2 being promulgated).  
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alone applies to patient data in most traditional healthcare environments.129 Cabining 
SUD and other chronic diseases has negatively impacted the role of primary 
healthcare in early diagnosis and discouraged mainstream providers from 
prescribing MAT.130 It has also led to exceptional policies (that are also structural 
determinants) not seen in the treatment of other chronic diseases, including the IMD 
exception, tying MAT to OTPs, and the patient limit attached to the buprenorphine 
waiver.131 These differentials offer insights into both the impact of stigma and also 
the roots of its perpetuation.  
Policymakers have attempted to close the gap between behavioral and 
mainstream healthcare services. That was the thrust of both the Mental Health Parity 
Act of 1996132 and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008.133 
The ACA went further, mandating substance use treatment as essential health 
benefits in Medicaid and marketplace plans and reducing the chance of those with 
mental health or substance use histories from being denied coverage by prohibiting 
medical underwriting.134 However, as already discussed,135 it does not follow that 
there are sufficient treatment resources to meet the demand. For example, those 
seeking treatment will be forced “out-of-network” at a far higher rate than those 
seeking other medical or surgical services136 and half of all marketplace plans have 
behavioral health “narrow networks.”137  
Exceptionalism surrounding substance use prevention, treatment, or recovery 
perpetuates stigma. As described by Craig Lefebvre, “structural stigma consolidates 
and sustains stigma through the cultural norms, institutional practices and policies 
that constrain the opportunities and well-being of people addicted to opioids and 
                                               
129 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164 (2018); see also Covered Entities and Business 
Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/covered-entities/index.html [https://perma.cc/R52G-GVFJ ] (discussing how, 
in general, the HIPAA rules apply to “covered entities,” including most doctors, hospitals, 
and treatment facilities). 
130 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6-5, 6-6. 
131 Apply to Increase Patient Limits, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 
SERVS., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/buprenorphine-waiver-
management/increase-patient-limits [https://perma.cc/HDL9-5JUF]. 
132 Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (1996). 
133 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343 tit. V sub. B, § 
511, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881 (2008).  
134 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2019). 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 110–113. 
136 STEPHEN P. MELEK ET AL., ADDICTION AND MENTAL HEALTH VS. PHYSICAL 
HEALTH: ANALYZING DISPARITIES IN NETWORK USE AND PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT 
RATES 1 (2017), http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2017/NQTLDisparity 
Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2R7-2KMA]. 
137 Jane M. Zhu et al., Networks in ACA Marketplaces are Narrower for Mental Health 
Care than for Primary Care, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1624, 1626 (2017). 
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provide a reinforcing context for stigma when practiced by individuals.”138 Stigma 
endorses the moral defect theory of SUD rather than viewing it as another chronic 
disease. And not treating it as a continuing chronic disease perpetuates the 
dichotomous idea that a person with SUD is either “clean” or “addicted.” 
Policymakers seem more comfortable with incremental moves over 
fundamental change. Symbolic gestures such as the appointment of commissions139 
or czars140 are far easier than the development, financing, and implementation of 
complex policy solutions to a wicked problem. Those who question the value of 
incremental reforms often run into the “perfection is the enemy of the good” 
argument. However, as we face recurring addiction crises, “good” increasingly will 
not be good enough.141 
 
VII.  FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
 
The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (“CARA”)142 was 
the first major federal legislation to address the current opioid crisis. It authorized 
federal grants to address harm reduction and healthcare issues such as educational 
programs, naloxone availability, evidence-based treatment for the incarcerated, 
disposal sites, MAT demonstration, and Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
(PDMPs).143 CARA directly appropriated only $181 million per year.144 A few 
months later Congress passed The 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures”).145 Cures 
directly appropriated $1 billion in funding for the first two years of opioid-related 
                                               
138 R. Craig Lefebvre, The Stigma Shadow Over the Opioid Crisis, RTI (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.rti.org/insights/stigma-shadow-over-opioid-crisis? [https://perma.cc/P4Q2-
PU84]. 
139 Rachel Roubein, Trump Appoints Opioid Commission, HILL (May 10, 2017), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/332871-trump-appoints-opioid-commission 
[https://perma.cc/7BBL-E42G].  
140 Jeremy Diamond, Top White House Official to Leave West Wing to Become Drug 
Czar, CNN (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/09/politics/jim-carroll-white-
house-national-drug-control-policy/index.html [https://perma.cc/E6PP-9K4V]. 
141 Nicolas P. Terry, Reports on the Opioid Crisis Are Full of Misidentified Problems 
and Poorly Calibrated Solutions, BILL OF HEALTH (July 19, 2018), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2018/07/19/reports-on-the-opioid-crisis-are-full-of-
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142 Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695 
(2016). 
143 The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), CADCA, 
https://www.cadca.org/comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-cara [https://perma.cc/ 
RLD3-KMYE]. 
144 Jessica Hulsey Nickel, Statement on the President Signing CARA into Law, 
ADDICTION POL’Y FORUM (July 25, 2016), https://www.addictionpolicy.org/blog/statement-
on-the-president-signing-cara-into-law [https://perma.cc/4R26-RZY2]. 
145 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
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programs.146 Subsequent appropriations bills continued or increased funding for 
CARA and Cures treatment, prevention, and recovery programs to more than $3 
billion for FY 2017 and $4.7 billion for FY 2018.147 For example, in April 2018, 
HHS released $485 million to the states under SAMHSA Opioid State Targeted 
Response grants authorized by the Cures Act.148 Most recently, the Substance Use–
Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and 
Communities Act of 2018 (“SUPPORT”)149 promised approximately $9.3 billion in 
opioid-related funds. However, most of those funds are re-authorizations of existing 
programs.150 Notwithstanding, SUPPORT did authorize a new SAMHSA grant 
program for establishing or operating Comprehensive opioid recovery centers.151 
The Trump Administration has heralded these large sums designed to combat 
the opioid crisis.152 However, although large, they do not map satisfactorily to a 
national epidemic that has caused a trillion dollars of damage to the country. 
According to a 2018 McKinsey report, “the opioid crisis has received less funding 
and research attention than other pervasive problems in the US [such as Cancer or 
HIV/AIDS] have received.”153 For example, while SUPPORT added $2.1 billion to 
Medicaid funding, that sum represents just 0.04% of total Medicaid funding.154 
Indeed, legislation proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Elijah 
                                               
146 See, e.g., Rachel Roubein, Budget Deal Includes $6 Billion to Fight Opioid Abuse, 
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(2018). 
150 AIDS United, Congress Quietly Makes Progress on Its Opioid Bill and FY19 
Funding, POZ (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.poz.com/blog/congress-quietly-makes-
progress-opioid-bill-fy19-funding [https://perma.cc/BHY7-QV8B]. 
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Cummings suggested $100 billion in funding over 10 years.155 The disconnect 
between the country’s losses caused by the opioid epidemic and the funds made 
available by the federal government is perhaps one explanation why so many states 
and counties are pinning their hopes on litigation against opioid manufacturers and 
others in the distributions chain.156 Other issues with the federal grant programs have 
surfaced. For example, the original two-year guarantee of funding in the Cures Act 
was viewed as one-time money, causing states to hesitate to develop and build 
programs that later would not be sustainable.157 
In addition to funding state efforts to address the opioid epidemic, the CARA 
Cures and SUPPORT Acts all sought to address some of the structural impediments 
to prevention, treatment, and recovery. These positive steps include: 
 
• Improvements in funding for Medicaid health homes that can coordinate 
care.158 
• A requirement that state Medicaid programs cover all three types of FDA-
approved MAT from 2020 to 2025.159 
• Expanded Medicare use of telehealth treatment.160 
• Increased screening for opioid use disorder and other substance use 
disorders among Medicare beneficiaries.161 
• Expanded Medicare coverage of OTP care.162 
• An increase in the number of patients (up to 275) to whom qualified 
physicians may prescribe MAT.163 
• Made permanent the MAT prescribing authority for physician assistants 
and nurse practitioners.164 
• Suspended the so-called IMD prohibition for 2019–2023, allowing states 
to use Medicaid reimbursement for certain inpatient treatment.165 
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(Apr. 18, 2018), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/383787-warren-cummings-seek-
100b-to-fight-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/AD3T-BTHD]. 
156 See generally Nicolas Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, S. CAROLINA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (analyzing the reasoning behind state, city, county, and tribal nations 
investigations and or litigations against individuals and companies involved in the opioid 
prescription drug supply chain). 
157 Rachana Pradhan & Brianna Ehley, Hundreds of Millions in State Opioid Cash Left 
Unspent, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/19/opioid-
crisis-funding-unspent-468658 [https://perma.cc/E447-2HAQ]. 
158 SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 1006(a) 
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160 See id. § 2001. 
161 See id. § 2002. 
162 See id. § 2005. 
163 See id. § 3201(a). 
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• Established a six-year loan repayment agreements with substance use 
disorder treatment professionals in high need areas.166 
• Provided resources for hospitals to develop discharge protocols that 
provide naloxone and connection with peer-support specialists.167 
• Authorized a pilot program to provide persons in recovery with stable, 
temporary housing.168 
 
These reforms, if implemented in timely manner (and grant processes followed 
by state implementation will create a lag), will help. Notwithstanding, too many of 
the projects authorized by the SUPPORT Act eschew bold, direct, and timely 
intervention and, for example, convene expert groups, request studies, research, or 
reports.169 Other provisions tend to favor demonstration programs or pilot programs 
rather than long-term strategies. And, little is done to address social determinants of 
health or stigma. Furthermore, critics argue that the legislation takes “a scattershot 
approach that nibbles at the issue around the margins — and misses problems that a 
more comprehensive strategy or package of bills could fully address.”170 Addressing 
the Medicaid provisions, Cindy Mann and Jocelyn Guyer perhaps captured the 
SUPPORT Act’s overarching limitation, arguing that it is notable “for what it 
does not include, most prominently, a major, sustained infusion of new funding to 
expand community-based care for substance use disorders.”171 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Wendy Parmet, discussing the healthcare of another marginalized, stigmatized, 
vulnerable population, observed “non-citizen immigrants are the canaries in the 
health care coal mine . . . they are among the most vulnerable groups in the United 
States. Consequently, they are often the first to experience the gaps, inefficiencies, 
and conflicts in our health care system.”172 So it is with those suffering from OUD. 
Their chronic illnesses are not the product of moral defect, but the social 
determinants of health that in many of our states show few signs of being addressed. 
When those who suffer or their families seek help, they run into a healthcare system 
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that is not bolstered by any comprehensive plan to provide patients with access to 
care, is woefully underequipped to deal with system stressors such as epidemics, 
lacks required services, and, even if such services do exist, is unable to deliver them 
because of acute fragmentation. When reforms do occur, they tend to be exceptional 
rather than holistic changes consistent with parity principles. As long as those 
suffering from OUD remain marginalized and stigmatized, a feedback loop will 
reduce the likelihood of meaningful changes in federal or state policies. Similar to 
the undocumented, those suffering in the opioid epidemic provide us a window into 
our healthcare policies and systems, a window that does not reveal an attractive 
view. 
